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This paper describes IZAΨMOD, the policy microsimulation model of the Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA). The model uses household microdata from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study and firm data from the German linked employer-employee dataset 
LIAB. IZAΨMOD consists of three components: First, a static module simulates the effects of 
a tax reform on the budget of the individual households. Secondly, behavioral labor supply 
responses are estimated. The third component distinguishes our model from most other 
microsimulation tools. A demand module takes into account possible restrictions of labor 
demand and identifies the partial equilibrium of the labor market after the supply reactions. 
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This paper describes IZA￿MOD, short for IZA Policy SImulation MODel, the be-
havioral microsimulation model of the Institute for the Study of Labor (Institut zur
Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)). IZA￿MOD consists of three main components. The
basis is a static microsimulation model for the German tax and bene￿t system. The
second module is an econometrically estimated labor supply model, which takes
into account behavioral reactions to tax reforms. The third component is a labor
demand module, which completes the analysis of the labor market and allows a
global assessment of the e⁄ects of policy measures. Figure 1 shows the basic setup
of IZA￿MOD. Components one and two are based on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), a representative panel study of private households
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Figure 1: Basic setup
1Microsimulation models (MSM) have become a standard analyzing tool of eco-
nomic policies during the last 20 years. The main feature of a microsimulation
approach is the partial equilibrium analysis that simulates the e⁄ects of a policy
reform (i.e. tax or bene￿t change) on one side of the market (i.e. households, ￿rms,
individuals). The simulation basically consists of evaluating e⁄ects of a change in
the economic environment of individual agents in terms of welfare or activity (Bour-
guignon and Spadaro (2006)). MSM are based on microdata and therefore account
for heterogeneity of economic agents within the population. Hence, the advantage
of MSM consists in the precise identi￿cation of winners and losers of a reform, which
allows for the overall evaluation of welfare e⁄ects as well as political economy factors
that may obstruct the implementation.
Within the MSM category, many models are applied to redistribution policies.
Tax models, for example, are widely used to simulate the distributional consequences
of a tax or bene￿t change among heterogeneous groups of families and to predict the
likely costs to the government of a proposed or hypothetical policy reform (Creedy
and Duncan (2002)).
As far as the distributional analysis is concerned, there is a variety of di⁄erent
approaches. Non-behavioral models, also referred to as arithmetic models, simulate
changes in the real disposable income of individuals or households due to a tax or
bene￿t reform under the assumption that behavior is exogenous to the tax and ben-
e￿t system (Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). Hence, individuals are not allowed
to change their behavior and the models only simulate ￿rst-round e⁄ects, which
comprise immediate ￿scal and distributional changes.
In contrast to arithmetic models, behavioral models take some kind of behavioral
response of individuals or households into account. Within this approach, labor
supply and consumption are among the types of behavior most frequently included
in the analysis. Microeconometric labor supply models incorporate a theoretical
grounding of the behavioral response and allow for the modeling of labor supply
decisions along the extensive (labor market participation) as well as the intensive
(hours worked) margin (Peichl (2009)). Usually, a labor supply module is either
integrated into the microsimulation model or can be linked to it as an external
module.
The simulation steps of IZA￿MOD can broadly be described as follows: First,
the database is updated using the static ageing technique1, which allows control-
1Cf. Gupta and Kapur (2000) for an overview of the techniques to modify the data for the use
2ling for changes in global structural variables and a di⁄erentiated adjustment for
di⁄erent income components of the households. Secondly, the current tax system is
simulated using the modi￿ed data. IZA￿MOD computes individual tax payments
for each case in the sample considering gross incomes and deductions in detail.
The individual results are multiplied by the individual sample weights to extrapo-
late the ￿scal e⁄ects of the reform with respect to the whole population.The result
of this simulation is the benchmark for di⁄erent reform scenarios which are also
modeled using the modi￿ed database. After applying the current tax and bene￿t
system the disposable income is computed for each household. Based on these net
incomes the distributional e⁄ects of the tax system at the status quo are assessed.
Thirdly, a discrete choice household labor supply model is applied to estimate con-
sumption/leisure preferences of each household using the calculated net incomes and
information on working hours. Fourthly, the e⁄ects of tax and bene￿t reforms are
analyzed. The reforms will change the net incomes of the households (￿rst-round
e⁄ect), which in a second step will induce labor supply reactions following the pre-
viously estimated consumption/leisure preferences which are assumed to be ￿x. In
a last step, the labor demand module is employed to estimate how the labor supply
reactions translate into employment e⁄ects.
The setup of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data
used for the di⁄erent modules. Section 3 sets up the tax bene￿t module, in section
4 the labor supply module is presented and section 5 describes the labor demand
module. Section 6 concludes by presenting selected applications of IZA￿MOD.
2 Datasets
2.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study
Both the tax bene￿t and the labor supply module of IZA￿MOD are based on the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study, which is a microdata household panel study.
GSOEP was launched in 1984 as a representative cross-section of the adult popula-
tion living in private households in (Western) Germany and dealt with the expansion
of its ￿survey territory￿due to the fall of the Berlin wall in late 1989 by introduc-
ing the East German sample in June 1990 (Wagner et al. (2007)). The number of
cases was enlarged over time by additional samples that represent the entire Ger-
in microsimulation models.
3man population. Moreover, the representativeness of the sample was improved by
oversampling certain groups such as high income households or foreigners. Thanks
to a refresher sample in 2006 the cross-sectional number of cases is at the level of
about 20,000 households.
The dataset is intended to follow original sample members as long as possible,
but new households are constantly added to the sample as well. In order to obtain
a less-biased view of the entire household and its members as well as to ensure high
data quality, not just one respondent per household is interviewed (proxy interview),
but all adult members (individuals 17 years and older) (Wagner et al. (2007)).
The main purpose of GSOEP is to measure well-being. Besides information
on psychological and, more recently, also on behavioral concepts, the main focus
rests on income data, which is also the major dimension of information exploited by
IZA￿MOD. Among others we draw the following data from the GSOEP: gross wage,
job type, government transfers, working time, composition of households, age and
education of household members and housing costs. IZA￿MOD is constantly up-
dated to the newest GSOEP wave, but it is also possible to employ older waves (back
to the year 2005) to analyze potential e⁄ects of changes in the German population,
e.g. in the household composition.
IZA￿MOD di⁄erentiates between several types of households: (A) single house-
holds, (B) single parents, (C) couple households where only one spouse is ￿ exible
as far as working hours are concerned and (D) couples with two ￿ exible spouses.2
Additionally there are households, that are in￿ exible as far as their labor supply
decision is concerned. It is assumed that the labor supply reaction of those in￿ exi-
ble households is based on a di⁄erent consumption/leisure decision (or at least with
a di⁄erent weighting of the relevant determinants3) than that of those working full
time. We assume that a person is not ￿ exible in his/her labor supply, meaning he
or she has an inelastic labor supply, if a person is either
￿ younger then 16 or older then 65 years of age,
￿ in education or military service,
￿ receiving old-age or disability pensions,
￿ self employed or civil servant.
2This notation will be kept during the rest of the documentation.
3Therefore, it is not possible to assume the same econometric relationship for these persons.
4Every other employed or unemployed person is assumed to have an elastic labor
supply.
Another important di⁄erentiation is the assignment of individuals to three skill
levels. The high-skilled hold a university, polytechnical or college degree. Medium-
skilled workers have either completed a vocational training or obtained the German
highest high school diploma, called "Abitur". Unskilled workers have neither ￿nished
vocational training nor obtained Abitur.
The database is updated to the year of analysis (i.e. 2010) using the static ageing
technique4 which allows controlling for changes in global structural variables as well
as a di⁄erentiated adjustment for di⁄erent income components of the households.
The GSOEP is adjusted from 2007 onwards. The ￿rst step is to reproduce the
fundamental structural changes of the population. This is done according to the
following criteria: age (in 5 year categories), assessment for income tax (separate or
joint) and region (East/West Germany).
The method applied here follows Quinke (2001): The cases from the sample are
compared to aggregated statistical data for the whole population regarding the above
named criteria to calculate the degree of coverage. Assuming that this degree re-
mains stable over the years, the actual aggregate population statistics and prognosis
for the year 2010 times the coverage degree allows for an approximate adjustment
of the database to account for the basic structural changes. Technically, the sample
weights need to be adjusted. The weighting coe¢ cients indicate how many actual
cases of the real population are represented by each case in the sample. Using the
software package "Adjust" by Merz et al. (2001), the sample weights are adjusted
according to 52 possible combinations of the attributes (13 age categories times 2
assessment types times 2 regions) so that the extrapolation of the sample using the
adjusted weights better represents the actual population structure.
In the second step, the taxpayer￿ s incomes are updated with respect to the vary-
ing development of di⁄erent income types. Also di⁄erent income growth rates be-
tween West and East as well as for positive and negative incomes are taken into
account. This allows for a di⁄erentiated estimation of the income development.
Based on empirical research of the DIW (see, e.g., Bach and Schulz (2003)) di⁄er-
ent coe¢ cients for positive and negative incomes are applied on each case￿ s income.
For the simulation model this means that each income value is multiplied with the
4Cf. Gupta and Kapur (2000) for an overview of the techniques to modify the data for the use
in microsimulation models.
5speci￿c coe¢ cient and thus extrapolated to the current income level. Of course,
the coe¢ cients only represent the average development, but regarding the whole
population this method provides a satisfying approximation to the current income
structure.
2.2 The Linked Employer-Employee Dataset LIAB
As the GSOEP is a household survey and does not contain any information on ￿rms,
the demand module is based on a di⁄erent dataset. We employ the linked employer-
employee dataset (LIAB) from the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) in
Nuremberg, Germany.5 The LIAB combines data from the employment statistics
from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit) with
the IAB Establishment Panel, which are panel data on plant level. The employment
statistics come from o¢ cial records, namely the German employment register, which
covers all employees paying social security taxes or receiving unemployment bene￿ts.
Since 1973 all employers have been required to report all employees covered by social
security to the social security agencies (Bender and Haas (2002)). All these noti￿-
cations are aggregated to a big dataset called employee history, which covers about
80 percent of the German employees. Civil servants, self-employed and family work-
ers are not included in the statistics. Among others, the employee history provides
information on daily wages, age, seniority, schooling, training, occupation, industry
and region (Bender et al. (2000)). In a ￿rst step, the Institute of Employment Re-
search combines the employee history with the bene￿t receipt history, that is data
on the bene￿ts received when unemployed. Thus, the periods of non-employment
are ￿lled, completing the (un)employment history of the individuals.
The second source of the LIAB is the IAB Establishment Panel, which contains
annual information on establishment structures and personnel decisions in the pe-
riod from 1993 onwards (Alda et al. (2005)). It is a representative strati￿ed random
sample from the population of all establishments that only covers establishments
5The advantage of using linked employer-employee data in the context of labor demand estima-
tions is straightforward. When only relying on employee data, it is possible to observe quali￿cation
and wages, but generally no information on ￿rms is available. When using datasets on ￿rms, vari-
ables like output, labor demand and investments are observed, but in general the individual wages
of the employees are missing. Sometimes the sum of wages and the number of workers can be used
to calculate an average wage. This procedure, however, has a major disadvantage, since the most
important variable determining the labor demand from a theoretical perspective, i.e. the wage, is
derived from an aggregate. It is not observed on the micro level which automatically casts doubt
on the reliability and accuracy of the results.
6with at least one socially insured employee. The name establishment has to be
taken literally, since the unit of observation is the individual plant, not the com-
pany. Consequently, there can be several plants per company (K￿lling (2000)). The
establishment panel covers 16 industries and 10 employment size classes. In 1993
the sample comprised 4265 plants, that is 0.27 percent of all plants in Western Ger-
many. The Eastern German subsample was established in 1996. In 2005 the uni￿ed
sample was made up of 16,280 establishments.
The goal of the panel is to provide detailed information of the demand side of the
labor market. Therefore, questions on the sta⁄, the changes in employment and the
structure of the quali￿cation claim a big part of the questionnaire (K￿lling (2000)).
Further questions are on export, investment or technological status. All these topics
are treated annually. Other information is not provided every year; indicators on
technological change, for example, are only available for the waves of 1995, 1998,
2000, 2001, 2004 and 2007.
The employee history is linked with the establishment panel via a plant identi￿er.
In order to reduce the size of the datasets, several versions of the LIAB are available.
In general, the models can be separated into cross-sectional models and longitudinal
models. The cross-sectional model only covers people working in an establishment
on June, 30th, of every year, which is the reference date of the establishment panel
questionnaire. Thus, the numbers of individual noti￿cations is kept relatively low.
In contrast, the longitudinal models cover all noti￿cations during a certain period
of time, but limit the number of plants covered. There are four longitudinal models
varying in the time periods and number of establishments and employees included.
For the cross-sectional design there is only one model available. It covers the years
from 1993 to 2006, 4000 to 16000 establishments and 1.8 to 2.5 millions employees
a year (Jacobebbinghaus (2008)).
We use this cross-sectional model and select the waves from 1996 to 2007 due to
several reasons. First, we need to have a su¢ ciently high number of Eastern German
plants. Therefore we ignore the waves prior to 1996. Second, we are interested in
a general estimation of German labor demand. Therefore we choose as many years
as possible, covering times of economic crisis as well as of economic prosperity. As
far as the employees are concerned, we are interested in full-time workers, excluding
trainees, home and part-time workers.
One important characteristic of the employee history is that the wages are right-
censored at the upper limit for contributions to the statutory pension fund. In 2008,
7this limit was 5300 euros per month for a Western German employee. Up to this
limit the contributions to the pensions insurance of workers and employees are 19.9
percent. For an income of 5300 euros per month, this yields about 1055 euros of
contributions, which marks the maximum monthly amount of contributions to the
pension fund. Consequently, the wages above the threshold have to be imputed
using a censored regression model. We use a technique designed by the IAB to
correct for right-censored wages (Gartner (2005)). Covariates for the imputation
are age, tenure, quali￿cation, sex and dummies for foreign workers as well as for
Eastern/Western Germany and industries. The imputation is done separately for
every wave.
As for quali￿cation we distinguish between three skill levels: unskilled, medium-
skilled and high-skilled workers following the classi￿cation presented in section 2.1.
Since we are interested in the labor demand depending on the skill levels, individ-
uals with missing information on quali￿cation are dropped. In the end the average
de￿ ationized real wages per skill group and per establishment are computed, as well
as the number of employees per plant and skill level.
As far as the establishment data is concerned, we are mainly interested in output
and capital. Since there is no direct measure of capital, we approximate capital by
the investment in the preceding year, following an approach chosen by several other
authors using LIAB (see e.g. Bellmann et al. (2002), K￿lling and Schank (2002),
Addison et al. (2008)). Output and capital are both de￿ ationized using the German
consumer price index. Plants with missing information on output or capital are
dropped, as well as establishments with less than three workers in any skill category.
Finally, time and industry dummies are computed.
The data from the employee history are linked with the establishment sample
year by year. Employees working in a plant that is not part of the Establishment
panel are dropped, as well as establishments whose workers could not be identi-
￿ed in the employment statistics. Eventually, all waves are combined to a pooled
cross-sectional dataset. The set comprises 11 years (from 1996 to 2007) and 4,073
establishments, which are on average observed 3.3 times during our period of con-
sideration. On the whole, this gives us 13,451 observations.
83 Static tax bene￿t module
In this section, the modeling of the German tax bene￿t system is described. As the
system is very complex, we focus on the major parts of the model in this description.6
3.1 Modeling the German income tax law
Individuals are subject to personal income tax. Residents are taxed on their global
income; non-residents are taxed on income earned in Germany only.7
3.1.1 Income sources
The basic steps for the calculation of the personal income tax under German tax law
are illustrated by table 1. The ￿rst step is to determine a taxpayer￿ s income from
di⁄erent sources and to allocate it to the seven forms of income, the German tax
law distinguishes between8: income from agriculture and forestry, business income,
self employment income, salaries and wages from employment, investment income,
rental income and other income (including, for example, annuities and certain capital
gains). For each type of income, the tax law allows for certain income related
deductions. In principle, all expenses that are necessary to obtain, maintain or
preserve the income from a source are deductible from the receipts of that source.
The second step is to sum up these incomes to obtain the adjusted gross income.
Third, deductions like contributions to pension plans or charitable donations are
taken into account, which gives taxable income as a result. Finally, the income tax
is calculated by applying the tax rate schedule to taxable income.
3.1.2 Taxable income
The subtraction of special expenses (Sonderausgaben), expenses for extraordinary
burden (au￿ ergew￿hnliche Belastungen), loss deduction and child allowance from
adjusted gross income gives taxable income.
6This section is partly based on the documentation of the microsimulation model FiFoSiM,
which was also developed by Andreas Peichl, cf. Peichl and Schaefer (2009).
7The legal norm setting up the German tax system is called Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG). As
the concrete tax rules, especially speci￿c numerical values such as ceilings, allowances or deductible
contributions constantly change, we will only present the general underlying principle of the tax
system and refer to the concrete legal norm, from which the current concrete numerical values can
be obtained.
8See EStG §§13 - 23.
9Sum of net incomes from 7 categories
(receipts from each source minus expenses)
= adjusted gross income
- deductions
(social security and insurance contributions, personal expenses)
= taxable income x
￿ tax formula
= tax payment T
Table 1: Calculation of the personal income tax
The special expenses consist of:
￿ alimony payments
￿ church tax
￿ tax consultant fees
￿ expenses for professional training
￿ school fees of children
￿ charitable donations
￿ donations to political parties
￿ expenses for ￿nancial provision, i.e. social insurance contribution9
The social insurance contributions are normally equally split between employer
and employee. Social insurance payments consist of health insurance, old-age, un-
employment and nursing care contributions. As for health insurance, civil servants
and self-employed are insured privately. Ordinarily, employees can choose a private
insurance as well if their income exceeds a certain threshold. All other employees
fall under the statutory health insurance. As for old-age insurance only civil ser-
vants are excluded from the statutory insurance and are insured under a speci￿c
pension plan. As far as the unemployment insurance is concerned, civil servants,
9For the concrete legal regulation, see EStG §§10 - 10c.
10self- and marginally employed are exempt from the statutory plan. Each social in-
surance premium is calculated as contribution rate times the income that is subject
to contributions up to the according contribution ceiling.10
The expenses for extraordinary burden consist of:
￿ expenses for the education of dependants, expenses for the cure of illness,
expenses for home help with elderly or disabled people, commuting expenses
caused by disability in certain cases
￿ allowances for disabled persons, surviving dependants and persons in need of
care
￿ child care costs
￿ tax allowances for self used proprietary, premises and historical buildings11
Furthermore, negative income from the preceding assessment period (loss deduc-
tion carried back) is deductible from the tax base.12
Each tax unit with children receives either a child allowance 13 or a child bene￿t14
depending on which is more favorable15. In practice, each entitled tax unit receives
the child bene￿t. If the child allowance is more favorable, it is deducted from the
taxable income while in this case the sum of received child bene￿ts is added to the
tax due. The model includes this regulation as it compares allowance and bene￿t
for each case.
Taxable income is computed by subtracting these deductions from the adjusted
gross income.
3.1.3 Tax due
The tax liability T is calculated on the basis of a mathematical formula which, as
of the year 200916, is structured as follows:
10Current contribution rates and ceilings can be found in the Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB). For health
insurance see SGB-V, for old age insurance see SGB-VI, for unemployment insurance SGB-III and
for nursing care insurance SGB-XI.
11For more details, see EStG §§33 - 33b.
12See EStG §10d.
13Cf. EStG §32.
14The amount of child bene￿ts can be found in §66 of the EStG.
15See EStG §31.
16Since 2009, Germany levies a dual income tax with a ￿ at rate of 25% on capital incomes in
addition to the progressive tax schedule on the other income sources.
11T =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if x ￿ 7;834
(939:68￿x￿7834
10000 +1400)￿x￿7834
10000 if 7;834 < x ￿ 13;139
(228:74￿x￿13139
10000 +2397)￿x￿13139
10000 +1007 if 13;139 < x ￿ 52;552
0:42 ￿ x ￿ 8064 if 52;552 < x ￿ 250;400
0:45 ￿ x ￿ 15576 if x > 250;400
where x is the taxable income.17 For married taxpayers ￿ling jointly, the tax
is twice the amount of applying the formula to half of the married couple￿ s joint
taxable income.
3.2 Modeling the bene￿t system
In addition to the tax schedule, the German bene￿t system, mainly consisting
of unemployment bene￿t, housing bene￿t, and social bene￿ts, is also modeled in
IZA￿MOD.
3.2.1 Unemployment bene￿t I
Persons who were employed subject to social insurance contributions at least 12
months before getting unemployed are entitled to receive the so-called unemploy-
ment bene￿t I (according to the SGB-III). The amount to be paid depends on the
average gross income of a certain period.
The GSOEP panel data contains information about previous unemployment ben-
e￿t payments, employment periods, etc. When modeling a person￿ s working time
categories it has to be examined whether the person might get unemployment ben-
e￿ts in certain working time categories. This is assumed for persons who received
unemployment bene￿ts or who were employed subject to social insurance contribu-
tions at least 12 months within the last 36 months. The remaining net income is
deducted from the unemployment bene￿t.
3.2.2 Unemployment bene￿t II
The unemployment bene￿t II replaced the former system of unemployment support
and social bene￿ts in the course of the so-called Hartz reform. All employable
17See EStG §32a.
12persons between 15 and 65 years and the persons living with them in the same
household are entitled to receive unemployment bene￿t II, as soon as they are no
longer entitled to receive unemployment bene￿t I.18
In contrast to the latter, unemployment bene￿t II depends on the neediness of
the recipient and is therefore means-tested. Needy is a person who, by his own
household￿ s income, is not able to satisfy his own elementary needs and those of the
persons living in his household. The unemployment bene￿t II corresponds to the
former social bene￿ts system plus housing and heating costs if necessary. This basic
amount for each person is means-tested against the household￿ s net income.
3.2.3 Social bene￿ts
Persons who are not able to take care of their subsistence are entitled to receive
social bene￿ts. Ever since unemployment bene￿t II (see above) was introduced,
only non employable persons can receive social bene￿ts. Furthermore, social bene￿ts
are paid in extraordinary circumstances such as impairment of health. Analogous
to unemployment bene￿t II the basic amount for each person and their respective
household net income are taken into account to determine the amount of social
bene￿ts actually paid.19
3.2.4 Housing bene￿ts
Housing bene￿ts are paid on request to tenants as well as to owners. The number
of persons living in the household, the number of family members, the income and
the rent relative to the local rent level determine if a person is entitled to receive
housing bene￿ts.20
First, summing up the individual incomes considering the basic allowances gives
the chargeable household income. Then, due to missing information about local rent
levels, the weighted averages of rents up to the maximum support allowed are taken
into account to determine the housing bene￿ts.
18See SGB-II.
19See SGB-XII.
20See §26 SGB-I and Wohngeldgesetz WoGG.
134 Behavioral labor supply module
Tax-bene￿t models with labor supply responses are the prime example for behavioral
microsimulation models. Many tax and transfer policies are designed to encourage
labor supply participation.21 Hence, tax-bene￿t models are a crucial economic tool
to ex-ante evaluate a given policy reform not only in terms of changes in the net
income but also in terms of behavioral responses of the economic agents. The budget
constraint of the household in the model is a⁄ected by a change in the tax-bene￿t
system. Therefore, households modify their disposable income and may decide to
change their labor supply (Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). The consideration of
behavioral responses in the model may be done through estimation of a structural
econometric model or through the calibration of working hours (see e.g. Creedy
and Duncan (2002)). Within the model framework, there are several possibilities to
model labor supply. A major distinction can be made between the use of continuous
and discrete behavioral models.
4.1 Discrete vs. continuous labor supply modeling
When analyzing the behavioral responses induced by di⁄erent tax reform scenarios,
one has to choose, among others, whether to apply a discrete or a continuous labor
supply model. For recent surveys of the empirical literature on labor supply models
see, for example, Heckman (1993), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) or Creedy et al.
(2002).
In the standard continuous model (see Hausman (1985)), labor supply responds
along the intensive margin: an in￿nitesimal change of the marginal tax rate changes
the working hours only a little, whereas participation responses cannot be analyzed
within this framework satisfactorily (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). In contrast,
discrete choice labor supply models allow to analyze both the extensive (partic-
ipation) and the intensive (hours worked) labor supply decision within the same
modeling framework (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Van Soest and Das (2001) and
Van Soest et al. (2002)). The intensive decision depends on the e⁄ective marginal
tax rate, whereas the extensive participation decision depends on the tax wedge
between gross (pre-tax) labor costs and the after-tax net income of workers (see
Kleven and Kreiner (2006)).
21See for example the Working Families￿Tax Credit (WFTC) in the United Kingdom.
14These stylized facts have consequences for the choice of a suitable supply model.
The continuous model ￿appears not to capture the data, in the sense that the
number of part-time jobs is strongly overpredicted￿ (Van Soest (1995)). There
seems to be a lack of part-time jobs because of ￿xed costs of hiring workers or
increasing returns to scale of the worker￿ s production. Furthermore, because of
￿xed costs of working (Cogan (1981)), individuals are not willing to work below a
minimum number of hours. In addition, there are working time regulations that
limit the number of possible working hours to a discrete set. Therefore, a discrete
choice between distinct categories of working time seems to be more realistic than
a continuum of in￿nitesimal choices. Using a discrete choice labor supply model
has also the advantage to model nonlinear budget constraints as a result of, for
example, nonlinear taxes, joint ￿ling and unemployment bene￿ts (see MaCurdy
et al. (1990), Van Soest (1995) or Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). Furthermore, a
richer stochastic speci￿cation in terms of unobserved wage rates of nonworkers and
random preferences can be incorporated into a discrete choice model.
4.2 Labor supply estimation
It is for the reasons presented in the preceding subsection that we choose a struc-
tural discrete choice household labor supply model. Following Van Soest (1995) we
assume that the household￿ s head and his partner jointly maximize a household util-
ity function in the arguments leisure of both partners and net income. Household
i (i = 1;:::;N) can choose between a ￿nite number (j = 1;:::;J) of combinations
(yij;lmij;lfij); where yij is the net income, lmij the leisure of the husband and lfij
the leisure of the wife of household i in combination j. Based on our data we choose
seven working time categories for men and women (0, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50 hours
per week).
We model the following translog22 household utility function








is the vector of the natural logs of the
arguments of the utility function. The elements of x enter the utility function in
linear (coe¢ cients ￿ = (￿1;￿2;￿3)
0) and in quadratic and gross terms (coe¢ cients
22Cf. Christensen et al. (1971).
15A(3￿3) = (aij)). Using control variables zp (p = 1;:::;P)23 we control for observed







where m;n = 1;2;3.
Following McFadden (1973) and his concept of random utility maximisation24
we add a stochastic error term "ij for unobserved factors to the household utility
function:





Assuming joint maximization of the households utility function implies that
household i chooses category k if the utility index of category k exceeds the utility
index of any other category l 2 f1;:::;Jgnfkg, if Uik > Uil. This discrete choice
modeling of the labor supply decision uses the probability of i to choose k relative
to any other alternative l:






0xil) > "il ￿ "ik] (5)
Assuming that "ij are independently and identically distributed across all cate-
gories j following a Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, the di⁄erence of the utility
index between any two categories follows a logistic distribution. This distributional
assumption implies that the probability of choosing alternative k 2 f1;:::;Jg for
23We use control variables for age, children, region and nationality, which are interacted with
the leisure terms in the utility function because variables without variation across alternatives drop
out of the estimation in the conditional logit model (see Train (2003)).
24Cf. McFadden (1981), McFadden (1985) and Greene (2003).
16household i can be described by a conditional logit model25:













For the maximum likelihood estimation of the coe¢ cients we assume that the
hourly wage is constant across the working hour categories and does not depend
on the actual working time.26 For unemployed people we estimate their (possible)
hourly wages by using the Heckman correction for sample selection (see Appendix)27.
The household￿ s net incomes for each working time category are computed in the
tax bene￿t module of IZA￿MOD.
After the consumption leisure preferences are estimated, the probabilities of
changing working time categories due to a changed net income induced by a tax
reform can be calculated. There are various methods to derive these probabilities
(see Creedy and Duncan (2002) for an overview). IZA￿MOD uses an analytical
approach proposed by Bonin and Schneider (2006a), which optimally exploits infor-
mation on the range of error terms by comparing real choices with predicted choices
in the status quo. Moreover, it is based on the assumption that the error terms
remain unchanged after a change of disposable income. Algebraically, the proba-
bilities of changing the working time category are derived conditional on being in
a certain (optimal) category m before the reform. In a last step, the overall new
working hours for the whole population are calculated.
4.3 Labor supply elasticities
Instead of analyzing the e⁄ects of a tax reform MSM can also be employed to derive
labor supply elasticities, a measure frequently reported in labor economics indicating
the percentage reaction of labor supply induced by a certain percentage rise of one
of the variables determining income. There are several distinctions that have to be
borne in mind when reporting elasticities. First, it has to be distinguished between
25McFadden (1973). Cf. Greene (2003) or Train (2003) for textbook presentations.
26This assumption is common in the literature on structural discrete choice household labor
supply models (see Van Soest and Das (2001)).
27Cf. also Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979).
17hours and participation elasticities. The former ones report the percentage change
in labor supply after a rise of an income related variable. Thus, they indicate
the reaction at the intensive margin, whereas participation elasticities focus on the
e⁄ect at the extensive margin. Secondly, the elasticities can be uncompensated
or compensated. The latter ones only measure the substitution e⁄ect, whereas
the former ones comprise substitution and income e⁄ect. Thirdly, elasticities may
be conditional or unconditional. Conditional elasticities measure the labor supply
reactions conditional on being part of the labor force prior to the change in income,
whereas unconditional elasticities also take into account reactions at the extensive
margin. Fourthly, the rise of the income variable may vary. Normally it is either
increased by one or by ten percent. Finally, the income variable itself has to be
chosen. Commonly, one increases the gross wage, the net wage or the net income.
Table 2 shows the uncompensated, unconditional, one percent, own wage hours
and participation elasticities.
Type A Type B Type C Type D Total
F M F M F M F M
Hours 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.13
Participation 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.11
Table 2: Estimated one percent LS elasticities (hours)
From looking at the table three basic conclusions can be drawn. First, all hours
elasticities are positive, implying that the positive (negative) substitution e⁄ect of
a wage rise on labor (leisure) overcompensates the negative (positive) income e⁄ect.
Second, participation elasticities are smaller than hours elasticities, which must be
true, since we have estimated unconditional hours elasticities which comprise the
participation decision. Nevertheless, it becomes obvious that the participation elas-
ticities make up a big share of the hours elasticities, implying that the participation
decision is the driver of the positive labor supply e⁄ect. Finally, with one exception,
women have higher elasticities than men. These qualitative results also hold, when
gross wages are increased by ten percent.
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively in line with other studies both
for Germany (see e.g. Bonin et al. (2002), Steiner and Wrohlich (2004), Haan and
Steiner (2005), Bargain and Orisini (2006), Haan and Steiner (2006), Haan and Uh-
lendor⁄ (2007), Fuest et al. (2008) or Bargain et al. (2010)) and in an international
context. Most studies on labor supply ￿nd that labor supply responds rather along
18the extensive than the intensive margin (see e.g.Heckman (1993), Immervoll et al.
(2007) or Fuest et al. (2008)). In particular, certain subgroups (at the bottom of
the income distribution) have rather high participation elasticities (see Eissa and
Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Immervoll et al. (2007)). More-
over, working-hours elasticities are close to zero for men (see Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999)) and women (see Mroz (1987), Triest (1990)).
4.4 Welfare e⁄ects
The computation of welfare measures is another important aspect for the evalua-
tion of e¢ ciency e⁄ects of tax reforms. Several methods and measures have been
developed in the long literature of Welfare Economics.28 The empirical application
of these methods mostly focuses on the ex-post evaluation of consumer demand us-
ing time-series data from before and after a tax reform. Creedy and Kalb (2006)
propose a method for the ex-ante analysis of the e⁄ects of tax reforms on the labor-
leisure decision. Following this method, we compute the changes in the equivalent
variation as a money metric welfare measure based on the microeconometrically es-
timated utility function of the labor supply model described in the appendix. The
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where Ei is the expenditure function, p the price (wage) vector and Ui the utility
level before (superscript 0) and after (1) the reform. The change in the welfare (in
terms of the (negative) excess burden) of the individual 4Wi can be expressed as
4Wi = ￿(EVi ￿ 4Ti)
where 4T is the change in tax revenue. Assuming a Utilitarian aggregation function,





28See Slesnick (1998) for a comprehensive survey.
195 Labor demand module
The incorporation of labor demand adjustments is an important extension to mi-
crosimulation models, since employment predictions can only be accurate when tak-
ing into account the demand side as well. In order to control for demand e⁄ects and
see how labor supply reactions eventually translate into employment outcomes, we
￿rstly estimate the labor demand for Germany (section 5.1). In a second step, we
feed this information into IZA￿MOD (section 5.2).
5.1 Labor demand estimation
This section provides only a short and rudimentary description of our labor demand
estimation strategy and our results. For a more thorough presentation see Peichl and
Siegloch (2010b). Almost all studies that estimate labor demand depart from the
dual approach. Assuming a constant output, cost minimization yields the same factor
demands as pro￿t maximization (Hamermesh (1993)). In general, we are faced with
a cost function of some form. We apply Shephard￿ s lemma (see Shephard (1970))
to the cost function and derive estimable factor demand functions conditional on
output. From these it is trivial to derive own-wage elasticities for di⁄erently skilled
labor. There are several cost functions, which can be chosen. For IZA￿MOD we
pick a non-constant return to the scale Translog speci￿cation with three di⁄erently
skilled, ￿ exible labor inputs, capital as a quasi-￿xed input, a time trend and industry
dummies. We obtain a labor demand elasticity of ￿0:62, ￿0:33 and ￿0:89 for high-,
medium- and low-skilled workers.29
5.2 Supply-demand iterations
The demand module of IZA￿MOD uses these elasticities to calculate labor demand
adjustments after a change of the labor supply.30 Building on approaches proposed
by Creedy and Duncan (2005) and Haan and Steiner (2006), these adjustments can
be considered as a third-round e⁄ect after the technical adjustment of the budget
and the behavioral e⁄ects of the labor supply following a tax reform. The rationale
29For more the details on the impacts of di⁄erent speci￿cations and the estimation procedure
and a comparison of our results with ￿ndings on labor demand for Germany, see Peichl and Siegloch
(2010b).
30For a more detailed description of the demand module and its e⁄ect, see Peichl and Siegloch
(2010a).
20behind the demand module can be best described graphically and is based on the
presentation by Haan and Steiner (2006).
Figure 2 shows the e⁄ects of some general tax reform shifting labor supply to
the north-east. Without a demand module, implicitly assuming a perfectly elastic
labor demand, the resulting employment would be at EB. Taking into account the
labor demand curve, however, it is trivial to see that this cannot be the solution of
the labor market under perfect competition, since supply does not equal demand.
Since the own-wage labor demand elasticities are theoretically and also empirically
negative, a rise in employment is associated with a decrease in the wage. These














Figure 2: Demand module
The labor demand module of IZA￿MOD, thus, uses the elasticities derived from
the labor demand estimations to calculate the change in wage which has to follow
the change in employment of EB ￿ EA. In a next step this wage change is used
to recalculate the net income of the household, which will again have an e⁄ect on
labor supply. This e⁄ect is simulated using the new net income and the established
leisure/consumption preferences. Assuming a positive labor supply elasticity, the
labor supply shifts to the left reducing the initial positive employment e⁄ect. Once
again using the demand elasticities, this reduction of the employment will lead to
an increase in the wage, leading to a right shift of the supply curve. This procedure
is iterated until the employment shifts and thus the wage shifts become arbitrarily
21small31 and the model converges. At this point supply equals demand and we are
situated in the market equilibrium.32
6 Applications and further development
So far, IZA￿MOD has been applied to simulate the e⁄ects of several reform pro-
posals for Germany. The model is ￿ exible enough to assess a wide range of possible
changes of the German tax and bene￿t system, such as an introduction of workfare
concepts, ￿ at tax schedules, tax credits or negative income tax systems.
Among others, concrete reformproposals which have been analyzed using IZA￿MOD
are:
￿ the e⁄ect of a workfare, requiring every recipient of government transfers to
work full-time as proposed by IZA (cf. Bonin and Schneider (2006b))
￿ the introduction of a Negative Income Tax in combination with a ￿ at tax
and the simpli￿cation of social insurance payments as proposed by the former
prime minister of the Free State of Thuringia, Dieter Althaus (cf. Bonin and
Schneider (2007))
￿ the introduction of wage subsidies in the spirit of the US Earned Income Tax
Credit in combination with a workfare as proposed by the ifo Institute in
Munich (cf. Bonin et al. (2003) and Bonin and Schneider (2006b))
￿ a tax reform proposed by the German liberal party in the run-up to the 2009
national elections reducing the progression of the current schedule by intro-
ducing three tax brackets (cf. Neumann et al. (2009))
IZA￿MOD is constantly revised and extended. For information on the most cur-
rent version, please consult the IZA￿MOD section on IZA￿ s homepage (www.iza.org).
31Here we consider a change of less than 10,000 hours a months, which equals 250 full-time
equivalents or less than 0.1 percent of the average labor supply e⁄ect of our reform scenarios to be
arbitrarily small. The maximum number of iterations is set at 50.
32It must be noted that ￿gure 2 is merely a broad illustration of that iteration process. The
￿gure misleadingly suggests that the way into the equilibrium in point C is achieved by walking
down the new labor supply curve LSB. In reality, the wage change which is calculated via the
labor demand elasticity leads to a new simulation of the labor supply reaction. Thus the LS shifts
again.
227 Appendix: Heckman correction
Statistical analyses based on non-randomly selected samples often include selection
biases that may lead to erroneous conclusions from the estimated model. In our
case, the parameters of the utility function are estimated using the data of employed
individuals, whereas the simulation of the labor supply behavior is also conducted for
non-workers. The economic model assumes that these people have an o⁄ered wage
below their reservation wage and therefore do not o⁄er work. As a consequence, one
will mainly observe individuals with a relative high wage rate, which leads to biased
results concerning the correlation of labor supply decisions and wage rates.
The two-step estimation method developed by Heckman (1979) helps to avoid a
biased selection sample and is shortly presented here.33




i￿ + "i (7)
and is called the equation of primary interest. In this case, the variable of interest
is the wage rate yi, which is not observed if the individual is not working. Equation
(7) captures the relationship between yi and some factors of in￿ uence, denoted
xi. The error term "i is assumed to be normally distributed with zero expected
value E("i) = 0 and constant variance var("i) = ￿2
u. The second equation, which





i￿ + ui with E(ui) = 0;var(ui) = 1: (8)
It is assumed that "i and ui have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means
and a positive correlation corr("i;ui) = ￿ (see Puhani (2000)). In order to estimate
equation (7), one has to be aware that the wage rate is only observed for individuals
who are working. For ￿ 6= 0, a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
of equation (7) may lead to biased estimates of ￿. The regression function of the
sub-sample may be stated as
E(yijxi;D = 1) = x
0
i￿ + E("ijD = 1); (9)







i￿ + ui >0
0 if w0
i￿ + ui <0:
(10)
Therefore, yi is only observed (D = 1) if the sum of a weighted determining factor
of labor supply wi￿ and the error term ui is greater than zero.




equation (9) will only equal equation (11) if E("ijD = 1) = 0, which is normally not
the case. Given that "i and ui have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means
and corr("i;ui) = ￿, it can be shown that the conditional expectation of the error
term "i is:






￿(￿) and ￿(￿) represent the density and cumulative density functions of the standard
normal distribution respectively. Inserting equation (12) into (9) yields
E(yijxi;D = 1) = x
0













is also called the Inverse Mills Ratio. Equation (13) can now be rewritten as
E(yijxi;D = 1) = x
0
i￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿i: (15)
According to Heckman, the problem with using OLS on equation (7) is that estimates
of ￿ may be biased due to an omitted variable problem, where the Mills Ratio is the
omitted variable. The procedure proposed by Heckman consists of
1) Run a probit model of the treatment on the vector w to obtain estimates of
￿=￿u.
2) Construct the Inverse Mills Ratio ￿ by using these estimates.
3) Estimate equation (7) by running OLS of yi on x, using the estimated Mills
24ratio as additional regressor.
The described procedure includes the omitted variable ￿i in the OLS regression
and therefore removes the bias in the estimates of ￿.
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